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RESALE ROYALTY AND THE PRIMITIVE ARTIST
Anne Coladarci*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1939, Bill Traylor was living on the streets of Montgomery, Alabama'
Born into slavery in 1854, on a plantation near Benton Alabama, he was emanci-
pated at age 11, but continued to live and work on the plantation until 1938,
when the last members of the white family that had owned him died and the
plantation was sold. Penniless, he walked to Montgomery, where, after working
briefly in a shoe factory, he became homeless and slept on a pile of rags
between caskets in a Montgomery funeral home.2
From 1939 to 1942, Traylor drew pictures of people, animals and scenes from
the streets of Montgomery on pieces of cardboard which he hung on a clothes-
line for sale Charles Shannon, now in his eighties, bought the brightly colored
drawings that Traylor was selling for as little as five cents.4 Mr. Shannon, who
was an artist himself, provided material and supplies to Traylor,' organized local
exhibits, and bought most of his work.6
Bill Traylor died in 1947. During the past fifteen years, Traylor's work has
been recognized as some of the most important of the genre known as 20th
Century American Folk Art.7 Sotheby's recently sold a piece of Traylor's work
for $20,000.' A book entitled Bill Traylor, His Art, His Life was published by
Knopf in 1991, and sells for $50.00 a copy.9 His work is highly coveted, is in
permanent collections in many museums, including the Museum of American
Folk Art in New York"u and has been the subject of numerous shows and arti-
cles.
In August, 1991 at a family reunion in Atlanta members of Bill Traylor's
family learned for the first time about their ancestor, and the importance of his
* Anne Coladarci will graduate from DePaul University College of Law in May of 1994.
1. Vivian Raynor, Art: Traylor Drawings in Shows at 2 Galleries, THE N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,
1985, at C31.
2. Richard Perez-Penez, Link To an Illustrious Past, and a Possible Fortune, THE N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 9, 1992, at B2.
3. Holland Cotter, Art in Review, THE N.Y. TIMES, January 31, 1992, at C19.
4. Susannah Vesey, Man Who Befriended Folk Artist Accused of Art Theft, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Jan. 17, 1993, at A13.
5. Jonathan M. Moses, Heirs of Folk Artist Seek Rights to Work, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1992, at
B8.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Perez-Penez, supra note 2.
10. CHUCK AND JAN ROSENAK, MUSEUM OF AMERICAN FOLK ART, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 20TH
CENTURY FOLK ART 305, 306 (Abbeville Press, 1990).
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artwork." In November, 1992, the family filed a lawsuit against Charles
Shannon, his wife, and Hirschl & Adler Galleries, which has acted as Mr.
Shannon's dealer in New York, claiming that Bill Traylor's artwork belongs to
them. New York was chosen as the state to bring suit because of a favorable
ruling in a case involving an art theft from the Guggenheim which allowed the
museum to sue a private collector to recover a stolen work despite the passage of
time. 3 In Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell, the court upheld the application of
the Demand and Refusal Rule to defeat a statute of limitations defense. The
court held that a cause of action to recover the stolen art did not accrue until the
museum made a demand for its return, and that demand was refused by the
good-faith purchaser to whom the stolen works had subsequently been sold. The
New York court further held that the museum had no duty to exercise reasonable
diligence to recover the stolen work, and that its failure to do so did not trigger
the three year statute of limitations for causes of action in replevin. 4 The signif-
icance of this ruling in the Traylor case is obvious: Traylor's art work was ac-
quired by Shannon over fifty years ago. Any action in replevin against Shannon
would be barred by the statute of limitations without the Demand and Refusal
Rule, especially if Shannon could prove that members of the Traylor family were
aware of the existence of the art work prior to the lawsuit in 1992.
The issues in the lawsuit concern whether Charles Shannon stole the art work,
whether he paid a fair price for the art work, whether Bill Traylor was the victim
of racial exploitation, whether the art work that Mr. Shannon bought from Bill
Traylor could be categorized as "work for hire", whether Mr. Shannon properly
protected the copyright, whether Mr. Shannon can prove legal ownership, and
whether the Traylor family should be entitled to a share of the proceeds from
any subsequent sales.
The resale royalty right, or droit de suite as it is more commonly known, will
be the subject of this Article. 5 In addition I will discuss the effects of a federal
statute enacting the Berne Convention 6 droit de suite 7 on artists and their
heirs, collectors, galleries and the marketplace, as well as on existing state legis-
11. Vesey, supra note 4.
12. Moses, supra note 5.
13. Perez-Penez, supra note 2 (referring to Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell, 77
N.Y.2d 311, 569 N.E.2d 426 (1991).
14. Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell, 77 N.Y.2d 311, 315, 569 N.E.2d 426 (1991).
15. The droit de suite is the right of an artist to collect a royalty on the price paid for a piece of
his art work when that piece is resold. It is based on the concept that an artist retains a right in his
work and that it his continuing efforts as an artist that add value to the already existing works. The
droit de suite recognizes the distinction between literary and musical works that can be protected by
copyright law, and a visual artist's work, which is typically an individual piece, sold to a single buy-
er. Executive Summary, infra note 22, at ii.
16. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, September 9, 1886,
completed at Paris, May 4, 1896; revised in 1908, 1914, 1926, 1948, 1967, and in Paris, July 24,
1971, amended in 1979 [hereinafter Berne Convention], S. TREATY Doc. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 37
(196), Multilateral Conventions, Berne Copyright Union: Item H-i, 3 COPYRIoHT LAWS AND TREA-
TIES OF THE WORLD (BNA) 1, [hereinafter CLTW].
17. Id. Article 14ter of the Berne Convention.
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lation. I will also attempt to discuss whether the resale royalty right is in line
with the express purpose of federal copyright legislation (the Copyright Act of
1976),"s and whether that purpose is sufficient to meet the needs of our society
and the artists themselves, and how a federally enacted resale royalty right would
affect the recently enacted Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990.19
I will attempt to frame this discussion around the problems posed by Bill
Traylor and other similarly situated American folk artists, because by definition,
the folk artist is usually naive, poor, lacks bargaining power, and as an artist,
typically lacks any of the trappings,"0 such as an art degree, which would indi-
cate to the courts that his work should be classified as art meriting legislative
protection.
Because the folk artist, by virtue of his naivety and vulnerability is easy prey
for exploitation, legislative protection would appear desirable. On the other hand,
the art is often so primitive and unusual, the artists themselves so innocent and
seemingly fragile, that subjecting their work to the scrutiny of a court in order to
determine whether it meets the statutory standard for fine art,2 and thus is ca-
pable of protection, risks the threat of arbitrary classification of the work by a
possibly insensitive court. It is the very unique, individualistic quality of the art
which inherently defies classification. Legislative protection could inadvertently
destroy those unique qualities by establishing guidelines and forcing the art to fit
within them.
Furthermore, registration requirements = would in all likelihood not be met
by the primitive artist, who often lives in a remote area, is typically uneducated,
and, initially at least, does not create to make money, but rather to answer an
inner voice or vision. It seems equally unfeasible to expect a primitive artist to
protect his rights through contract.
Curiously, the folk artist is the exact embodiment of the romantic view of an
artist that inspired the concept of the droit de suite in the first place.
The Droit de suite evolved ... from a ... conception of art, the artist, and the
way art is sold. At its core is a vision of a starving artist, with his genius unap-
18. 17 U.S.C.A §§102-810 (1991).
19. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 (Dec. 1, 1990) (codified at 17
U.S.C.§101, 106A, 107, 113, 301, 411, 412, 501, 506, 608-610) [hereinafter Visual Artists Rights Act
or VARA].
20. Neil F. Siegel, The Resale Royalty Provisions of the Visual Artists Rights Act: Their History
and Theory, 93 DICK. L. REV. 17 (1988)(discussing how a judge or jury, after testimony from ex-
perts, would allow a piece of art work submitted for registration to be registered after being submit-
ted by someone with the "appropriate trappings").
21. The Art Preservation Act of California, CAL. CIv. CODE §987(b)(2) (Deering Supp. 1981)
protects only a work of "fine art" defined as "an original painting, sculpture or drawing of recognized
quality....".
22. Droit DE SUITE; THE ARTIST's RESALE ROYALTY: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPY-
RIGHTS OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. COMPILED BY THE GENERAL COUNSEL'S STAFF OF THE
COPYRIGHT OFFICE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, December, 1992, [hereinafter Executive Summary] Report
done in compliance with Section 608(b) of VARA, at xviii, (recommending that some form of art
registry in the form of a private authors' rights collecting society should be formed to collect art
resale royalties, and to manage the droit de suite).
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preciated, using his last pennies to purchase canvas and pigments which he
turns into a misunderstood masterpiece. The painting is sold for a pittance...
the purchaser is a canny investor who travels about artists' hovels trying to pick
up bargains which he will later turn into large amounts of cash. Thirty years
later the artist is still without funds and his children are in rags; meanwhile his
paintings, now the subject of a Museum of Modem Art retrospective, and a
Harry Abrams parlor-table book, fetch small fortunes at Parke-Bemet and
Christie' sY
II. THE MORAL RIGHTS
The concept of a resale royalty right embraces the natural rights theory that an
artist retains an interest in his creation after he has sold it. That, by his labor and
his creativity, the artist has actually infused the art with a part of himself; that
the art work is in fact a part of his individual, psychological identification,24 and
exists independently of its qualities as property. It is the recognition of this inter-
est which would allow an artist to continue to retain some control over his art
work after he has parted with it. In order to properly understand the resale royal-
ty right, or droit de suite, the discussion necessarily must start with an explana-
tion of the droit moral, or moral right, in which an artist retains certain rights in
his art work after he sells it.
Historically, there are two divergent rights that arise from an artist's creation
of his art. One right is the economic right, based on the view of the art as a
chattel, which in the U.S. has emerged into the statutorily created copyright
protection. 5 The other is the personal right, the theory of which is clearly mani-
fested in French law. This theory stems from the romantic conception, arising
from a natural rights view,26 that the integrity of the artist, the work's cultural
value, and therefore public interest, reside in artwork beyond its sale to a third
party." The rights that an artist retains in his works are called moral rights, or
the droit moral.28
In France, these moral rights derived originally from common law and were
statutorily enacted in 1957.29 Personal, perpetual, inalienable, unassignable, and
23. Monroe E. Price & Aimee B. Price, Right of Artists: The Case of The Droit De Suite, reprint-
ed in FRANKLIN FELDMAN AND STEPHAN E. WELL, ART LAw, at 562 (1986).
24. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1535, 1547 (1993)(discussing Lockean natural
rights theories of property).
25. 17 U.S.C.A §§102-810 (1991).
26. Robert C. Hauhart, Natural Law Basis For the Copyright Doctrine of Droit Moral, 30 CATH.
LAW., 53, 55 (1985).
27. Karen M. Corr, Comment, Protection of Art Work Through Artists' Rights: An Analysis of
State Law and Proposal For Change, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 855 (1989). see generally DaSilva, Droit
Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' Rights in France and the United States,
28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 1, 7-11 (1980).
28. Hauhart, supra note 26, at 56.
29. Jeff C. Schneider, Recently Enacted Federal Legislation Providing Moral Rights to Visual
Artists: A Critical Analysis, 43 FLA L. REv. 106, 107, (1991) see e.g. Loi du I1 mars 1957 Sur La
Propriete Litteraire Artistique, [19571 J.O., [1957] B.L.D. 197, art. 1, para. 1 (1957), cited in
[Vol. IV:207
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inheritable by the artist's heirs, the droit moral as it is known in France is a
bundle of rights. These include the right of creation, the right of disclosure, the
right to withdraw, the right to claim authorship, and the right of integrity, which
is the right to preserve work from alterations and modifications, destruction or
mutilation."
These rights are personal to the artist, and survive regardless of contract or
sale. The touchstone of liability is damage to the reputation of the artist.3
Deriving from notions of paternity, the rights that protect the art work and the
artists' interests in the artwork are equitable, rather than economic.a2 This is the
source of conflict with the United State's law. Statutory copyright, as well as
common law copyright is designed to protect an author's economic interest,
rather than the integrity of the work itself or the personal rights of the artist in
the artwork.33 It is from the early divergence of natural law and positive law
that the modem dilemma between moral rights and statutory protections for
artists and authors emerges.' Natural law has as its basis the belief that univer-
sal fundamental truth exists, and may be recognized through the use of reason
and conscience.35 Natural law concepts recognize the inviolability of an author's
personality in his work.' Positive law, on the other hand, is a product of state-
enforced social relationships where man is protected or constrained from acting
by the power of the state. 7 Positive law protects an author's personality in his
work only through state common law actions: breach of contract, unfair com-
petition, invasion of privacy, defamation.3"
Natural right theories of jurisprudence may be traced back to the Greek Phi-
losophers, in particular Plato and Aristotle,39 These theories were later trans-
formed during the period of the Stoics' into the concept of jus gentium, or law
DaSilva, supra note 14, at 437.
30. Schneider, supra note 29, at 107.
31. Id. at 110. citing J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 4-3
(1979).
32. Executive Summary, supra note 22 at xiii.
33. See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14, 23 (2d Cir. 1976)("American
copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of action for
their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal rights of au-
thors.").
34. Hauhart, supra note 26, at 60.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Hauhart, supra note 26, at 60, citing H. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW 75-109 (1947).
38. Hauhart, supra note 26. at 57, citing Note, Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral
Right Through Extension of Eristing American Legal Doctrines, 60 GEO. L.J. 1539, 1542-43 (1972).
39. Hauhart, supra note 26, at 60; see E. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE MEN AND IDEAS OF THE
LAW 342 (1953); Rose, The Law of Nature; An Introduction to American Legal Philosophy, 13 OHIO
ST. LJ. 121, 122 (1952).
40. E. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 342 (1953); The Stoic Philos-
ophy was responsible for three ideas of modem law and modem legal theory: The concept of a uni-
versal law for all mankind under which all men are equals; a method of deriving universal principles
of law from observing the laws of different societies, and a concept of a law binding upon all states:
an early "international law."
1994]
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of Nations; a concept of law that is universal in its application to all people.
Emphasizing what is ethical and just, the jus gentium, and a basically identical
theory, jus naturale42, became the basis of the Roman Law. Because these con-
cepts were based on natural reason, they were used to override local positive
laws, customs, and ordinances 3 Natural rights concepts predated the idea of
property rights as the basis for a legal system.' Natural Law theorists argue
that positive law was formed in order to provide protection for the moral rights
and duties that are imposed by God in a state of nature, and which are discern-
ible through the use of reason. 5 Interestingly, it was the problems of plagia-
rism, censorship, misappropriation and mutilation of literary documents that
spurred Cicero and Gaius46 to introduce natural law theories into Roman law.
These theories would arise later as moral rights to protect authors.47
The debate has gone back and forth through history: whether positive law
emanates from natural law concepts, or whether the origin of positive law was a
product of utilitarian use of the state to order society. The rise and fall of the
current popular attitude corresponds with social and industrial evolution: In the
seventeenth and eighteenth century, the periods of individualism and rationalism,
the natural rights doctrine was in the forefront with its adherence to the belief
that innate rights issued from the very nature of man as a rational being. 8 The
Industrial Revolution saw an emphasis on science, empirical thinking and a dis-
tinct movement away from the metaphysical emphasis of natural law theories.49
Natural Law and a value-oriented approach to thinking, which emphasized hu-
man rights, resurged in the twentieth century.' It is from this period, which was
influenced by earlier natural rights declarations, such as the American Declara-
tion of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man,"' that
the Berne Convention, with its doctrine of moral rights emerged.
41. E. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 342 (1953); Jus gentium was a
distinct body of legal concepts developed by Roman Jurists for litigation involving claims not only of
Roman citizens, but of foreigners as well.
42. The difference between the jus gentium and the jus naturale appears to be that the jus genti-
um tolerated slavery, and thus was the law common to all free men; while the jus naturale was com-
mon to all men. E. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 344 (1953).
43. E. PATrERSON, JURISPRUDENCE MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 344 (1953).
44. Hauhart, supra note 26, at 54.
45. Gordon, supra note 24, see JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287-88 (Peter
Laslett ed., 1967)(3d ed. 1698, corrected by Locke)(bk II§27).
46. Hauhart, supra note 26, at 59 (citing J. MUIRHEAD, THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND RULES OF
ULPIAN I, § 1 (1904)). Marcus Tullius Cicero (B.C. 106-43) was a Stoic follower, famous as a orator,
a politician, and a lawyer. Cicero espoused "true law": a concept that transcended laws and customs
of different nations, and "right reason" which existed in nature, in the universe, and in the minds of
the most learned men. Gaius (c. 110-180 A.D.) was a Roman juris who stated that the source of jus
gentium, the universal aggregate of laws, was the natural reason of man, or naturales ratio.
47. Hauhart, supra note 26, at 59.
48. Id. at 60.
49. Hauhart, supra note 26, at 61 (citing B. BROWN, THE NATURAL LAW READER 6-9 (1960)).
50. Hauhart, supra note 26, at 62.
51. Id. (citing N. KORKUNOV, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW 379-80 (1909)).
[Vol. IV:207
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III. THE BERNE CONVENTION
The Berne Copyright Convention52 is a unilateral, international copyright
treaty which affords adhering nations broad protections of moral rights. Formally
recognized as part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,53 it is a pow-
erful assertion of natural rights and natural law.' Adopted by 12 countries in
1886," it now has eighty-two signatory nations.56 The Beme Convention is
dedicated to the idea of universal copyright protection57 and provides that the
citizens of its member states are afforded the same degree of protection that each
state has provided for its own citizens.5" The Berne Convention is administered
by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
The moral rights provision of the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works59 was added to the Convention in 1928.' It estab-
lishes certain minimum moral rights6' and ensures mutuality between member
countries.62 Article 6bis recognizes two aspects of intellectual property: the eco-
nomic rights, and, independent of the economic aspect, the personal rights. The
legal protection of the personal, or natural rights is the droit moral.
63
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work, and
to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other deroga-
tory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor
or reputation.'
There are two moral rights recognized in article 6bis: the right of attribution,
which is the artist's right to claim authorship of his work and to control the
association of his name in the work,65 and the right of integrity, or respect,
which is the right to protect the integrity of the author and his work.' The right
52. The Berne Convention, supra note 16.
53. Hauhart. supra note 26, at 62, see UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS ARTICLE 27 (1948).
54. Hauhart, supra note 26, at 62.
55. Deborah Ross, Comment, The United States Joins The Berne Convention: New Obligations
For Authors' Moral Rights? 68 N.C.L. REV. 363, 365 (1990). (The 12 original nations were Austria-
Hungary, Belgium, Costa Rica, France, Germany, Great Britain, Haiti, Holland, Norway and Sweden,
Paraguay, Salvador, and Switzerland).
56. David Engvall, International Agreements: United States Accession To The Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 31 HARVARD TNT. L. J. 349, (1990).
57. Ross, supra note 55, at 364.
58. Id.
59. The Berne Convention, supra note 16, art. 6bis (hereinafter Article 6bis).
60. Engvall, supra note 56. at 352. (The Rome Convention of 1928).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 350.
63. Edward J. Damich, Tire Visual Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of Moral Rights
Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH U. L. REV. 945 (1990).
64. Berne Convention supra note 16, Article 6bis(1).
65. Damich, supra note 63, at 949.
66. M. NIMMER AND D. NMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §8.21[Al (1992) [hereinafter
Nimmer].
1994]
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of respect protects the artwork against mutilation, distortion, and any "other
derogatory action in relation to the said work which would be prejudicial to his
honor or reputation."'67
The protections provided by Article 6bis are broad. They are not limited to
works of visual art," Article 2(1) states: "The Expression "literary and artistic
works" shall include every production in the literary, scientific and artistic do-
main, whatever may be its mode or form of its expression."' The term of the
Article 6bis protection requires that moral rights last as long as economic
rights.7" Currently, those rights provide for protection for the life of the author
plus 50 years.71 The right is descendible. Article 2(6) provides that: "This pro-
tection shall operate for the benefit of the author and his successors in title."
Article 6bis also provides that, after the death of the artist, the rights descend in
accordance with the laws of the country where the rights are implemented.72
Other moral rights provided by the Berne Convention are the rights of anonymity
and pseudonymity,73 which protect an author's wish to remain anonymous or to
publish his art under a pseudonym.
BERNE RECOGNITION OF DROrT DE SUITE
Article 14ter of the Berne Copyright Convention recognizes an inalienable
right to an interest in any sale of a work of original art subsequent to the first
transfer. France, Italy, Germany, and Brazil, are all countries that have major art
markets that have enacted legislation recognizing the droit de suite.4 In the
United States, only California has adopted legislation conferring certain rights in
the resale of art.75 The droit de suite originated in France,76 and provides that
"authors of graphic and plastic works shall have, regardless of transfer of the
original work, an inalienable right to participate in the proceeds of any sale of
their work by public auction or through a dealer."'77 Intended to ameliorate what
appeared to be a great injustice when wealthy collectors were selling artist's
work for huge profits while the artist or his family lived in poverty," the leg-
islation has presently been adopted in some form by Algeria, Belgium,
Czechoslovakia, France, West Germany, Italy, Morocco, Poland, Turkey,
67. Berne Convention, supra note 16, art. 6bis, para. 1. at 41.
68. Damich, supra note 63, at 945.
69. Berne Convention supra note 16, art. (2)(1).
70. Berne Convention supra note 16, art. 6bis(2).
71. Berne Convention, supra note 16, art. 7(1).
72. Id.
73. Berne Convention, supra note 16, art. 7(3).
74. Lee D. Neumann, The Berne Convention and Droit De Suite Legislation in the United States:
Domestic and hternational Consequences of Federal Incorporation of State Law for Treaty Imple-
mentation, 16 COL. VLA J. OF LAW & THE ARTS 157 (1992).
75. CAL. CIV. CODE §896 (West Supp. 1992).
76. France, Law of March 11, 1957, tit. 2, art. 42, C. Civ. art. 543 (D.L. 1988).
77. JOHN H. MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, 2 Law Ethics and the Visual Arts 548 (2d ed.
1987).
78. Siegal, supra note 20, at 1, 2 (1988).
[Vol. IV:207
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Tunisia, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.79
The droit de suite is a means of providing on-going protection to fine artists
similar to that provided to authors by the copyright laws."0 A basic inequity
between authors and fine artists is the author's ability to continue realizing in-
come from the reproduction of his writing, while the fine artist can profit only
from the first time sale of his art. This inequity could be corrected by a resale
royalty. While recognized in the Berne Convention8 and many European
nations, the U.S., with the exception of California, has failed to recognize the
resale royalty. The Artist's Rights Act of 1990, did, however, direct the Copy-
right Office to conduct a study considering whether there should be federal legis-
lation enacting Article 14ter.82
Article 14ter (1) states: "The author, or after his death the persons or insti-
tutions authorized by national legislation, shall with respect to original works of
art and original manuscripts of writers and composers, enjoy the inalienable right
to the interest in any sale of the work subsequent to the first transfer by the
author of the work." 3 The act provides for reciprocity only in Berne member
nations that have legislation that permit a resale right, and only to the extent
provided for in the country where the right is claimed." National legislation of
each country that enacts article 14ter shall determine how the royalty is collect-
ed, and the amounts of the royalties.'
As envisioned by the Berne convention, the resale royalty stands for an in-
alienable, unwaivable right to share in the proceeds of subsequent sales of one's
art. Historically, artists in the United States have had to deal with the perceived
injustice through contract. In 1948, Grant Wood sold a painting called Daughters
of the America Revolution to a dealer. Some time shortly thereafter, the dealer
resold the painting for four times the original price. Wood, infuriated, included a
contractual stipulation into his work that he would receive 50 percent of the
profits each time a work is resold. 6 In 1973, Robert Scull, a wealthy art collec-
tor, sold a Robert Rauschenberg assemblage at auction for $85,000. He had
purchased it from the artist in 1958 for $900. Rauschenberg received none of the
profits. 7 It was the result of this recognized inequity that resale royalty rights
legislation was first introduced into Congress and in the California and Ohio
State legislatures.
79. Siegal, supra note 20 at 2, see Diane B.Schulder, Art Proceeds Act: A Study of the Droit de
Suite and a Proposed Enactment for the United States, 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 19, 22 note 13 (1966). See
also Goetzl and Sutton, Copyright and the Visual Artist's Display Right: A New Doctrinal Analysis, 9
COLUMB. J. L. & ARTS 15, 37 (1984) (note that current and recent events in Europe have significant-
ly changed certain countries).
80. NIMMER, supra note 66, § 8.22[A].
81. Berne Convention (Paris text), art. 14ter(2).
82. Act of Dec. 1, 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, See. 608(b).
83. Berne Convention, supra note 16 art. 14ter(1).
84. Id. art. 14ter(2).
85. Id. art 14ter(3).
86. See Grant Wood Paints George Washington and Cherry Tree, LIFE, Feb. 19, 1948.
87. Siegel, supra note 20, at 3.
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Without laws to protect him, it is incumbent upon the U.S. artist himself to
negotiate any resale rights. When you consider the naive artist who's work may
not be recognized in his own lifetime, who is not creating from an economic mo-
tive and who often lives in isolation, the burden of protecting his own rights in
his artwork is onerous. The European model anticipates that an artist, before his
talent is recognized, needs the protection of law. By making the benefits of a
resale right perpetual, inalienable, unwaivable and unassignable, the droit de
suite is given moral right status which recognizes a property right in the intan-
gible product of the artist's effort and the development of the artist through the
creation of a body of work throughout his lifetime. It also anticipates that the
value of an artist's work is seldom recognized at the initial sale, before the pas-
sage of time, and until the work has been viewed by the public in sufficient
amounts for it to gain recognition and status.
U.S. ADHERENCE TO BERNE CONVERTION
The United States, one of the most important art markets in the world,"8 has
been slow to embrace the concept of moral rights for artists. There exists a basic
conflict between the traditional American ideals of free alienability of property 9
and the bedrock principles of contract law," which hold, historically at least,
that the sanctity of a contract is inviolable, and the civil law belief that an artist's
interest in his artwork endures over and beyond the transfer of ownership.9
This conflict is overshadowed by the stated purpose of Article I § 8, clause 8 of
the Constitution92 which indicates that the purpose of copyright law is to protect
literary and scientific advancements through reward to the creators: advancing
secular goals through economic rewards, and providing a statutory and legislative
framework within which those goals are to be advanced.93
This conflict has been the subject of much interpretation, and the copyright
laws have been a pivotal area where these themes recur with regularity. The
underlying policy of the copyright law has been to protect the artist, frequently
from himself.94 The renewal term provided for by the Copyright Act of 1909"
was just such a protection. It provided for an original copyright period of 28
years with a renewal period for an additional 28 years, which was available by
application for renewal within a year before the expiration of the original twenty-
88. Schneider, supra, note 29, at 105 (Statement by Rep. Edward J. Markey, D-Mass.).
89. L. PINKERTON & J. GUARDALABENE, THE LAW ART PRIMER: A MANUAL FOR VISUAL ART-
ISTS 74 (1988).
90. Ross, supra note 55, at 375.
91. Karen Gantz, Protecting Artists' Moral Rights: A Critique of The California Art Preservation
Act as a Model for Statutory Reforn 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 873, 875 (1981).
92. U.S. CONsT. art. I §8, cl. 1, 8.
93. See 17 U.S.C. §106 (1982) (copyright owner has exclusive right to reproduction, adaptation,
publication, and display for original literary, musical, dramatic, pantomime, choreographic, pictorial,
graphic, sculptural, motion picture, audio visual or sound recorded works).
94. Fred Fisher Music Co. Et AL. v. M. Wionark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643; 63 S.Ct. 773 (1943).
95. §23 of the Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075.
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eight year period. This provision allowed an author at the beginning of his career
and in need of money to sell the copyright for a limited term, and then to reap
the profits of his artistic creation later.' An author could thus sell his copyright
without losing his renewal interest. Samuel Clemens, (Mark Twain) recounted
that he sold the copyright of Innocents Abroad for very little money, and it was-
n't until the first twenty eight year copyright period expired that he was able to
reap the profits of what had turned into a literary masterpiece.97 This system in
effect allowed an artist to recapture the profits of his personal interest in his
creation. Its viability as a protection was seriously limited by the decision in
Fred Fisher Music Co. Et. AL. v. M. Witmark & Sons" where it was determined
that the renewal rights of the copyright could be assigned prior to the renewal
period." Thus, an artist in an inferior bargaining position could essentially be
forced to sign away his rights in future profits. The court in Fisher refused to
enact a statutory restriction upon an artists ability to alienate his property, stating
that an artist may be unable to sell his work if the buyer cannot purchase it out-
right, and further stating that Congress could not justify enacting legislation that
would not only deny authors (or artists) the freedom to dispose of their property
as they pleased, but which would make them wards under guardianship of the
law.'0
Although natural law theory, with its tenents that the intangible products of a
man's labor can be property meriting protection, was an influencing factor for
the framers of our Constitution, and continues to hold an influence in the
courts,' the conflict between positive law and natural law continues to create
an ongoing dialogue. Until the U.S. joined the Berne Convention this dialogue
was characterized by a stubborn resistance to any type of natural or moral rights
apart from those created and limited by statute or common law. In fact, any
common law natural rights that existed in copyright law were effectively pre-
empted by Federal copyright law in the decision Wheaton v. Peters,"° where
the majority explicitly stated that common law copyright, based in natural law
theories of abstract morality, was subordinated by statutory copyright, which is
granted by the Government as a statutory privilege. 3
When the U.S. finally did join the Berne Convention, it was the result of a
desire to increase copyright protections against foreign infringement" and to
96. 318 U.S. at 654.
97. Id. citing Hearings before the Committee on Patents of the Senate and House of Representa-
tives on Pending Bills to Amend and Consolidate the Acts respecting Copyright, 60th Cong., Ist.
Sess., p. 20. (1906).
98. Fred Fisher Music Co Et Al. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643; 63 S.Ct. 773 (1943).
99. Id. at 644.
100. Id. at 657.
101. Gordon, supra note 24, at 1540.
102. Hauhart, supra note 26, Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834).
103. 33 U.S. 591 at 661.
104. Ross, supra, note 55, at 365 (The International Trade Commission reported U.S. losses be-
tween $43 billion and $61 billion in 1986 due to piracy and inadequate protection).
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create copyright relations with the adhering nations. °5 The U.S. had been the
principal in establishing a weaker copyright treaty, the Universal Copyright Con-
vention." The U.C.C. was ineffective, however, in protecting U.S. intellectual
property from foreign piracy," and in a climate of rising trade deficits, support
for the adherence to the stronger protections provided by the Berne Convention
gained momentum." A second and equally compelling reason for U.S. adher-
ence was a belief that accession would strengthen the U.S.'s bargaining position
in international trade talks."° Furthermore, the U.C.C. is administered by the
United Nations Educational and Scientific And Cultural Organization,
(UNESCO) from which the United States withdrew in 1984, thereby losing its
influence as a voting member."'
Congress passed the Berne Convention Implementation Act on October 12,
1988."' By its adherence, the U.S. automatically created copyright relations
with the other adhering nations; nations with which they had had no prior rela-
tionship under the U.C.C.. Adherence also expanded U.S. bargaining power for
trade negotiations."'
While the protections conferred by the Berne convention are broad, adherence
by the U.S. does not automatically confer these rights on the citizens of the U.S.
without specific legislative enactment."' As part of the legislative history of
the BCIA, the "House Committee state[d] unequivocally that Berne is not self-
executing, that domestic law is not in any way altered except through the imple-
menting legislation itself, and that the implementing legislation is absolutely
neutral on the issue of the rights of paternity and integrity. ' '"4
Only very minimal changes in the formalities of certain U.S. law that was
clearly incompatible with the Berne Convention"5 were enacted as a result of
the BCIA: such things as making copyright notice optional," 6 abolishing the re-
quirement that a copyright transferee record a transfer of copyright before insti-
105. Id.
106. Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. No. 3324, 216
U.N.T.S. 132, revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868, 943 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter U.C.C.].
107. Engvall supra, note 56, at 354.
108. Id.
109. Id. 24 at 355.
110. Ross. supra note 55 at 363, 366.
111. Engvall, supra note 56, at 355, note 48 citing (Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.)[hereinafter BCIA], eight days after Congress approved this Act, the Senate consented to U.S.
accession to the Convention. 134 CONG. REC. S16,939-40 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988). On March 1,
1989, The Convention entered into force with respect to the U.S., and the Implementation Act be-
came effective. See Pub. L. No. 100-568 § 13(a), 102 Stat. 2853, 2861, reprinted in 28 1.L.M. 1055
(1989)).
112. Engvall, supra note 56, at 356.
113. Neumann, supra note 74, at 157. See Implementation Act supra note 111, §2(I).
114. Implementation Act, supra note 111. See NIMMER, supra note 66, §8.21 [A][2][a].
115. Engvall, supra note 50, at 355.
116. 17 U.S.C. §401(a) (1983); now Pub. L. No. 100-568, §7(a)(2). 102 Stat. 2853. 2857.
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tuting an infringement action," 7 and abolishing the requirement that foreign na-
tionals need to register infringement claims with the U.S. Copyright office before
instituting any claims."'
As to the moral rights provided by the Berne Convention, the U.S. felt that
there was sufficient recourse through common law and the copyright act"9
without implementing Article 6bis.'" Any redress for grievances still had to be
approached either through the economic rights provided by the existing copyright
law,' through common-law theories of contract," or through claims based
on invasion of privacy, the law of waste, defamation,'" or unfair
competition."' These remedies were burdensome and their application was
characterized by little coherent or consistent treatment by the individual states or
the higher courts.
In Geisel v. Poynter Products, Inc.,'" the well known author and illustrator,
Theodor Seuss Geisel, better known as Dr. Seuss, attempted to prevent the as-
signee of a magazine publisher from manufacturing, promoting and selling dolls
based on his drawings, which he had sold under contract to the publisher. Calling
the dolls "tasteless, unattractive, and of inferior quality",126 Geisel attempted to
enjoin the defendants from using the name Dr. Seuss in connection with the ad-
vertising and sale of the dolls. Because no independent moral right existed which
would have allowed him to prevent the use of his name, or his pseudonym, with
the dolls, he pled five causes of action: violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act;'" unfair competition; violation of plaintiff's right to privacy under New
York Law; defamation; and conspiracy with intent to injure plaintiff.'" All five
causes of action essentially failed, the court holding that when he had contracted
the work with the original publisher, Geisel had not retained any rights with
respect to the characters that he had created. 29 The common law doctrine was
that authors or artists generally are presumed to transfer common law literary
property rights when they sell their manuscript or work of art unless those rights
are specifically reserved."3
In Zim v. Western Publishing Company, the author of a series of books suc-
117. 17 U.S.C. §205(d) (1983); now Pub. L. No. 100-568. §5, 102 Stat. 2853, 2857.
118. 17 U.S.C. §411 (1983); now Pub. L. No. 100-568 §9(b)(1), 102 Stat. 2853, 2859.
119. Gantz supra note 91, at 881, see DaSilva, Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing
Moral Right Through Extension of Existing American Legal Doctrines 60 GEo. L. J. 1939, 1561
(1972); see also Treece, American Law Analogous of the Author's Moral Right 16 AM. J. COMP. L.
487-500 (1968).
120. NIMMER, supra note 66, § 8.21[AI[2][b].
121. Geisel v. Poynter Products. Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
122. Zim v. Western Publishing Company, 573 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1978).
123. Edison v. Viva International Limited, 70 A.D.2d 379, 421 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1979).
124. Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952).
125. Geisel, supra, note 121.
126. Id. at 333.
127. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1964).
128. 295 F. Supp. 331.
129. Id. at 334.
130. Pushman v. N.Y. Graphic Socy., Inc., 287 N.Y. 302, 39 N.E. 2d 249 (1942).
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cessfully brought a breach of contract action against the publisher when he pub-
lished a series of books authored by the plaintiff with revisions that the author
had expressly disapproved of, where he had disapproved within the contracted
60-day period. The author further recovered under Florida law for the wrongful
and unauthorized appropriation of his name when the name appeared on the
revised editions of the books.'
In Edison v. Viva International Limited,3 ' the author of an article that had
been substantially changed by the editor prior to publication brought a breach of
contract claim based upon his moral rights, and an action for libel and slander,
alleging that the material added by the publisher cast the author into opprobrium
in the literary community.'33 The court, holding that the author's "moral right"
had been subsumed by the contract of publication which allowed the publisher to
"edit" and "change" the original article, further stated that there was no indica-
tion that the changes the publisher had made had cast the author into disgrace or
subjected him to ridicule by his literary peers."
In Granz v. Harris, the court held for the plaintiff under the doctrine of unfair
competition, where the defendant record company had taken the original record-
ings of the plaintiff artist and produced an abbreviated record with a cover that
read "presented by Norman Granz", where the new version substantially departed
from the original.'35 The court, in allowing a remedy for unfair competition,
held that where the plaintiff had a reputation as an expert in the presentation of
jazz concerts, the damage to his reputation from the sale of abbreviated records
was irreparable, where his name appeared on the cover, and allowed injunctive
relief.3
6
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos.'37 was brought under §43(a) of the
Lanham act, the trademark statute which provides in part:
"Any person who ... in connection with any goods or services ... uses in
commerce any word, term, name, symbol or device .... or any false designa-
tion of origin, or false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, . . . shall be liable in a civil action by any person who
believes he ... is likely to be damaged by such act."' 8
Gilliam was a case where the plaintiff successfully protected the author's right of
integrity under a section of the Lanham Act'39 (the trademark statute) which
protects a producer's public reputation. In Gilliam, ABC had edited portions of
Monty Python's Flying Circus so extensively that the court found that they had
distorted the authors' work and that presentation of the work in the edited form
131. 573 F.2d at 1326.
132. 70 A.D.2d 379, 421 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1979).
133. 421 N.Y.S.2d at 206-207.
134. Id. at 207.
135. 198 F.2d at 589.
136. Id. at 588.
137. 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
138. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1991).
139. 17 U.S.C. §7; Lanham Trade-Mark Act §43(a), 15 U.S.C. §1125(A).
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was deemed a misrepresentation which "impaired the integrity of appellant's
work."'" Recognizing that a cause of action which seeks redress for the defa-
mation of an artist's works has its roots in the continental concept of droit
moral, '4 the court indicated in dicta that a need existed for some sort of inde-
pendent legal protection for the rights of artists. Stating that although Copyright
law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal rights of authors,
the "economic incentive for artistic and intellectual creation that serves as [the]
foundation for American copyright law cannot be reconciled with [the] inability
of artists to obtain relief for mutilation or misrepresentation of their work to
public on which artists are financially dependent."'42
The rights of an artist were directly addressed in the case of Crimi v. Rutgers
Presbyterian Church.'43 The Church had contracted with an artist to paint a
fresco for the back wall of the church. The clergy and parishioners did not like
the depiction of Christ with his chest exposed, and had it painted over. The artist
sued for restoration of the work. The New York Supreme Court, relying on con-
tract, refused to prevent the destruction of the fresco. Refusing to recognize any
residual moral rights of the artist in his creation, the courts stated that all rights
had passed from the artist to the church pursuant to contract. The artist had no
recourse absent written reservation of his rights in the fresco."4
The confusion of applying different doctrines to enforce moral rights, incon-
sistent verdicts which lead to forum-shopping,45 a persistent need to address
the rights of visual artists, and a need to protect the art itself, led the way to the
statutory adoption of the Berne Convention Moral rights provision, article
6bis.'"
IV. THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS AcT OF 1990
The Visual Artists Rights Act of 199047 amended the 1976 Federal Copy-
right Act to confer explicit moral right protection for works of visual arts. 4 '
The Act was a consolidation of bills introduced by Senator Edward M. Kenne-
dy 49 and Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier.'- ° Although appreciatively
narrowed in scope and application from both the Kennedy and Kastenmeier bills,
the law as passed created a new section in the Copyright Act that explicitly gave
visual artists the right to claim authorship and the right to integrity.' 5' The stat-
140. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 25.
141. Id. at 24.
142. Id.
143. 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S. 2d 813 (1949).
144. Id. at 575.
145. Schneider, supra note 29, at 121.
146. Gantz, supra note 91. at 877.
147. VARA §610(a).
148. NIMMER, supra note 66, at § 8.21 [B]12].
149. S. 1198, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., (1989).
150. H.R. 2690, 101st Cong; 2d sess. (1990).
151. Schnieder, supra note 29, at 121.
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ed goals of the act are: (1) to protect the honor and reputation of visual artists;
(2) to protect works of art themselves; and (3) to provide a uniform national
standard for these protections.152 As enacted, however, the law is severely lim-
ited, and is in truth an eviscerated version of the Kennedy bill, let alone of the
moral rights envisioned by the Berne Convention.
The scope of application of VARA is significantly more narrow than the
scope of either Berne or the proposed Kennedy bill. The definition of the subject
matter covered by the act, includes a new category of'work of visual art": 53
"[a] painting, drawing, print or sculpture, existing in a limited edition of 200
copies or fewer, that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author, or, in
the case of a sculpture, in a multiple cast."'" It appears to allow protection to
only that art which fits into very narrow categories of fine art and which ex-
cludes huge areas of art that should be protected. There may be many artistic
works that do not fit neatly into a strict definition of a painting, drawing, print or
sculpture. The contrast with the Berne convention definition is especially glaring:
"The expression "literary and artistic works" shall include every production in
the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of
expression."'55 It is apparent that any new or experimental art may not qualify
for protection under the U.S. laws. "[S]taid courts confronting avant garde artists
may run into problems at the margin in evaluating whether a work qualifies."'"
Subjecting the qualification of art for protection to the scrutiny of courts risks
arbitrary decision making by members of the court who may not be sophisticated
or sensitive to artistic currents. As was recognized by Justice Holmes in his
opinion in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.:'"5
"It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves as final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, out-
side of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works
of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make
them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their
author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings
of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when
seen for the first time. At the other end, [protection] would be denied to pic-
tures which appealed to a public less educated than the Judge. Yet if they com-
mand the interest of any public, they have a commercial value - - it would be
bold to say they have not an aesthetic and educational value - -and the taste of
any public is not to be treated with contempt."'
59
The "recognized stature" requirement '59poses another, similar problem. The
risk exists that the courts will inflict their own taste upon the decision to qualify
152. 136 Cong. Rec. 12,608 (daily ed. June 5, 1990) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
153. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1)(1991).
154. Id.
155. Berne, art.2(1).
156. NIMMER, supra note 66, at §8.21[B].
157. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
158. Id. at 251-252.
159. 17 U.S.C. §106A(B).
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art, and thus exert pressure and control over what kind of art is produced. Faced
with a institutionalized criteria, and because the burden is on the person present-
ing the work for qualification to prove that it merits protection, the unknown
artist may be discouraged from attempting to protect their rights at all." ° While
not defined in the Act, the Kennedy bill provided that the determination of
whether a work is one of recognized stature is to be made by the "court or other
trier of fact.' 6 This requirement is particularly difficult with folk art. Folk art
is very primitive, and only recognized and appreciated by a narrow group of ad-
mirers. While the Kennedy bill stated that the trier of fact could be aided in his
determination of whether the art work is of "recognized stature" by "various
persons familiar with the art world," that would still be a subjective determina-
tion, and consequently, the folk artist could be overlooked. This requirement was
imposed to limit nuisance law suits, "such as the destruction of a five-year-old's
fingerpainting by her classmate,"'6" yet it threatens to narrow the art acceptable
to protection to the very art that is in least need of protection: if the artist is of
recognized stature, then most likely he or she is in a greater bargaining position
and in less need of protection.
Folk art is by its very definition not of recognized stature. To an unapprecia-
tive eye, it could appear very similar to the fingerpainting of a five year old. The
art of Bill Traylor is disarmingly simple. Drawn in lead pencil, often on scraps
of cardboard, lacking perspective, and filled with flat, bright colors, its lack of
sophistication lends energy and a unique quality of immediateness.
The requirement that a work of visual art, to be protected, must be copyright-
able, and that the "courts [should] use common sense and generally accepted
standards of the artistic community in determining whether a particular work
falls within the definition,"" is yet another hurdle that would discourage any
but well established artists, or artists with sufficient backing, from protecting
their work. The act states that a work is not eligible if it is not a "work of visual
art", if it is made as a work for hire, 64 if it is not otherwise eligible for copy-
right protection,"6 or if it is of unprotected national status. It further provides
that the rights are forfeited through lack of notice.'" The work for hire restric-
tion again limits the protections provided by the law.
The scope of the artist's rights conferred by VARA include the rights of
attribution and integrity. While the law states that these rights are inalienable,67
it also provides that they are waivable if expressly agreed in a written instrument
160. See NIMMER, supra note.66, at §8.21[B].
161. Damich, supra note 63, at 953.
162. Id. at 945.
163. NIMMER, supra note 66, at §8.21[B], citing (H.R. Rep. 101-514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1990)).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. NIMMER, supra note 66, at § 7.14 [A][1l(works first published before March 1, 1989, where
pre-existing artworks are retained by the author).
167. 17 U.S.C.§106A(e)(1).
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signed by the author."f The waivability provision is probably the most destruc-
tive provision in the law. It basically reduces the moral rights to economic rights
that can be bargained away as part of a contract to sell the work. An artist in
need of money, anxious to make a sale, and perhaps unaware of his rights, could
easily be pressured into signing away his rights in his art work without fully
understanding the impact of what he is doing. A folk artist would be especially
vulnerable to manipulation at the hands of a dealer or collector, upon whom they
are often very dependent. The Kennedy bill did not permit waivers, although it
did provide for consent."
The specific rights granted in VARA are generally rights of paternity. The
right of attribution includes the right to claim authorship, the right to demand
that the artist's name be used in conjunction with the display of her work, or,
conversely, the right to prevent use of her name on work she has not in fact
created, and the right to prevent the use of her name as author where her work
has been subjected to a distortion, mutilation or modification, which would be
prejudicial to her honor or reputation. 7'
The right of integrity includes the right to prevent any intentional distortion,
mutilation, or other modification, with the requirement that the changes must be
prejudicial to the artist's honor or reputation.' 7' It also includes the right to pre-
vent destruction of any work of recognized stature.' The language of the law
states that these rights are inalienable and exist independent of rights of copy-
right ownership, 73 which is freely alienable. Stating that both the right of eco-
nomic exploitation (copyright) 4 and the moral rights7 " vest in the author at
the creation of work, the language speaks in natural law terms. "An artist's pro-
fessional and personal identity is embodied in each work created by that artist.
Each work is part of his ... reputation. Each work is a form of personal expres-
sion.
An important change which occurred as a result of the Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1990 was in the common law doctrine that literary property rights are
presumed to transfer when the manuscript or work of art is sold."7 This pre-
sumption was reversed, and a requirement was added that a specific written
168. 17 U.S.C. § 106(e)(l).
169. 17. U.S.C. § 113(d): Consent applies to instances where the art works are in buildings: for
instance murals or installations, and the removal of the art work would result in destruction of the art
work, thus violating Section 106A(a)(2) and (3), (rights of disclaimer and integrity). This section
disallows the application of Section 106A(a)(2) and (3) if the author consented to the installation of
the art work before the effective date of Section 610(a) of VARA, or, if after the effective date, the
owner of the building and the author signed a written instrument that specifies that the installation of
the work may subject it to destruction, mutilation, or modification by reason of its removal.
170. NIMMER, supra note 66, at § 8.21[A].
171. Id. at § 8.21[B][2][C][i].
172. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
173. NIMMER, supra note 66, at §8.21[B].
174. 17 U.S.C. §106.
175. 17 U.S.C. §106A.
176. NIMMER, supra note 66, citing (H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1990)).
177. Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc'y, 287 N.Y. 302, 39 N.E. 2d 249 (1942).
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conveyance of rights will now be required in order to transfer the copyright in a
sale of any artwork or literature.
Another major deviation from the Beme moral rights, and a major weakness
in the VARA, is that the term of the moral rights as amended into the Copyright
law exist only for the life of the artist.'78 The Copyright Law in the U.S. pro-
tects the economic interests of the artist for the life of the author plus fifty
years. 9 The moral rights in the Berne convention provides protection for the
life of the author plus fifty years. The limited protection defeats one purpose of
the moral rights legislation, because it is a recognized fact that a work of art is
often not appreciated until much later in an artists career, often not until after his
death. Some protection should be provided to the artist's family who may have
supported him, and who may have endured poverty in order to allow him to pur-
sue his art. The art itself may need the protection of interested family members
if it has yet to be recognized until after the artist's death.
THE RESALE ROYALTY IN THE U.S.
Part of the Visual Rights Act of 1990 required a study of the feasibility of a
federal droit de suite, or resale royalty law.Y Currently, the only resale royalty
law now in effect exists in California.' As part of the study the copyright of-
fice held public hearings, and heard testimony from artists, gallery owners, muse-
um presidents, art dealers, lawyers, and witnesses that had had experience with
the resale royalty scheme under California law. Testimony was also heard from
an association that administers royalty distribution under the royalty scheme in
France,' and from a representative of the Federation Internationale des
Diffuseurs D'Oeuvre D'Art Originales, which is an association of 2,000 art gal-
leries in Europe. 3 The line seems to be rather clearly drawn between the art-
ists and the groups that support them, who are generally supportive of such legis-
lation, and the dealers, museums and galleries who view the royalty as an unfair
tax on an already burdened art market.Y
The results of the public commentary were inconclusive, in that the committee
felt that it lacked sufficient empirical evidence to measure whether the effects of
a federal resale royalty would suppress the art market, encourage creativity,
protect the artists that needed it the most, or subject the art market to the tastes
of Congress. Arguments for and against private versus collective administration,
registration, federal preemption of California 's law, alienability and waivability,
categories of works that should be covered, and triggering mechanisms for royal-
ty payment were all heard.
178. 17 U.S.C. §106A(d)(1).
179. 17 U.S.C. §302(a).
180. 17 U.S.C. §106A, §608(b), 104 Stat. 5132, P.L. 101-650 (Dec. 1, 1990).
181. CAL. CIV. CODE §986(a)(7)(West Supp. 1992).
182. Copyrights, Artists and Dealers Give Views On Resale Royalties For Works of Art, 47 THE
BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC. DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES. March 10, 1992, at A5.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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The committee's conclusions and recommendations concerning the enactment
of a resale royalty mirror the arguments for and against the legislative enactment
of moral rights in general. Stating that the "notion of an encumbrance attaching
to an object that has been freely purchased is antithetical to our tradition of free
alienability of property,"'" the study further pointed out that a royalty would
raise privacy concerns, because artists would need to learn about prices and
ownership in order to monitor their rights."s The study indicated there is some
evidence that the royalty has had an adverse effect on art markets of several
countries and California, and that administration of the royalty where it exists
has been besieged by problems.'87
The study concluded with a recommendation against enacting a royalty provi-
sion, stating that European protection of art has evolved from a natural rights
basis, where art is protected as an individual intellectual creation, while in the
U.S., copyright legislation, the vehicle for implementing moral rights and a re-
sale royalty, is grounded in the constitutional clause, and is driven by economic
exploitation. 8 Further arguing that the royalty would only benefit already suc-
cessful and well established artists, the study indicated that Congress would, in
order to make the droit de suite effective, be motivated to encourage the produc-
tion of work that would be resold, with the effect that traditional art work, such
as easel paintings and sculpture would be in effect subsidized, while new, ex-
perimental, avant garde or obscure work would suffer. Leaving the door open for
reconsideration, especially if the European Community were to harmonize the
driot de suite, the study nevertheless concluded that Federal legislation imple-
menting the droit de suite in this country was not currently advisable, and sug-
gested alternative methods of improving artists rights, which would be more in
keeping with our statutory scheme of copyright law, among them broader public
display rights, commercial rental rights, compulsory licensing, and increasing
federal grants and funding.
As an alternative to the droit de suite, a public display right as presented by
several commentators merits some consideration.'89 Basing a royalty on the
event of public display of the fine art, it has been argued that such an approach
would overcome many of the difficulties encountered in trying to implement a
resale royalty right. By using existing Copyright law, a public display right
would more closely parallel the rights granted to other artists, authors and
composers."9 It is argued that there is a royalty provision based on display
rights that lay latent in the existing Copyright law 9' at Section 106(5), the pub-
lic display right.' Stating that the lack of education, the notice requirement,
185. Executive Summary, supra note 22, at xi.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at xiii.
189. William A. Carleton. Note: Copyright Royalties For Visual Artists: A Display-Based Alterna-
tive to the Droit de Suite, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 510 (1991).
190. Id. at 512.
191. Carleton, supra note 189, at 511.
192. Id. at 523, (17 U.S.C. §106(5): The Public Display Right states that a copyright owner has
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and the concept of limited publication account for the lack of fine artist's lack of
use of the statutory copyright,'93 the argument is that with very little modifi-
cation to existing law, an artist could be compensated for income generated by
the display of his art. Based on the idea that a viewer essentially "copies" an
authentic work of art when he views it,"9 a display based alternative does more
closely parallel copyright law.
FEDERAL PREEMPTION
When an individual state, such as California has enacted legislation which
provides greater protections to the artist than does federal law, the question is
whether or not federal copyright law preempts state law. It has been argued that
until the federal laws recognize moral rights to the full extent provided for by
Article 6bis of the Berne convention, then state moral rights that provide more
protection should be allowed to bring American law closer to the requirements of
Article 6bis. 9" This would be in keeping with the original reading of the law,
which, prior to the enactment of VARA, looked to common law and statutory
copyright to provide the required moral rights protections.
The case of Morseburg v. Balyon'" was a challenge of the California droit
de suite on constitutional and statutory grounds. 97 The plaintiff's first claim
was that the act interfered with the buyer's constitutional freedom of contract.
But, the court found that the royalty scheme was within the state's police power.
The second constitutional claim was a due process challenge. In rejecting the
buyers' claim that they had lost a property right without due process of law, the
Ninth Circuit held that the California Act was neither arbitrary nor capricious,
and did not exceed constitutional limits. The California royalty also survived a
preemption challenge under the 1909 Copyright Act, the Ninth Circuit holding
that the California act created an in personam right against future sellers." ' Its
viability under the amended 1976 Copyright Act has yet to be tested.'"
V. CONCLUSION
The folk artist is the perfect embodiment of the romantic conception of the
artist. Naive, innocent, untouched by the realities of modem society, isolated
exclusive rights "to display publicly" or "to authorize" public display of "pictorial, graphic, or sculp-
tural works."
193. Id. at 514, citing Timothy M. Sheehan, Why Don't Fine Artists Use Statutory Copyright? An
Empirical and Legal Survey, 22 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 242 (1975).
194. Id. at 510.
195. Ross. supra note 55, at 386.
196. 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980).
197. Neumann, supra note 74, at 160.
198. 621 F.2d 972, at 977 (9th Cir. 1980).
199. 17 U.S.C. §301(a)(1988). This section states that "On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or
equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copy-
right as specified by section 106 ... are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is
entitled to any such right or equivalent right... under the common law or statutes of any State").
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geographically, socially and culturally from the outside world, the folk artist is a
conduit for ultimate truth. It is this precise quality of innocence and naivety that
provides enjoyment to the artist's audience, and is where the value of the art is
found. It is also the precise quality that renders the artists vulnerable and power-
less before exploitative investors, dealers and collectors. The true value of the
folk artist's work is rarely realized at the initial sale. It is only after people have
had a chance to view the art that its value begins to be realized, and it is the gal-
leries, the collectors and the museums that provide that environment.
By recognizing a relationship between the artist and his art work that tran-
scends its character as property, proponents of the resale royalty believe that this
ongoing relationship demands consideration. If an artist creates a piece of art
work early in his career, and sells it for a small price, and then through his own
development as an artist the value of his earlier work increases, he should be
entitled to a share of the increase in the profit when that piece is resold.
In France, the artists or their heirs get 3 percent of any resale of their art that
is sold in galleries or at auction, regardless of whether or not there is a
profit.2" The resale rights last as long as the economic rights, which is the life
of the artist, plus fifty years. The bill introduced by Senator Kennedy sought a
seven percent royalty of the appreciated value, and the model droit de suite
proposed by the Executive Summary suggested a flat royalty between three and
five percent with no threshold price. The California Act provides for a royalty of
5 percent for works of fine art that are resold for more than one thousand dol-
lars. The Executive Summary model recommended restricting the royalty to sales
at public auction. Both the Kennedy bill and the model proposed that the royalty
last as long as the economic rights provided for by the copyright law and that it
be descendible in a manner analogous to copyright."' The model also suggest-
ed that the droit de suite be collectively managed through a private authors'
rights collecting society, with collection of royalties handled on a direct or con-
tractual basis similar to musical performance royalties. The Executive Summary
concluded that if a resale royalty was enacted, it should be inalienable, and non-
waivable. There has been a substantial amount of work, thought and energy
expended in attempting to design a workable system for a resale royalty. It is, in
fact, a courageous effort that commands support and input. If we are to ever
enact a resale royalty, then we must ensure that it achieves the goals envisioned:
it must work to reward, encourage and stimulate new art and to protect artists
that have little power or influence.
Moral rights and the resale royalty may initially appear to be an unwarranted
restriction upon the property of an individual and contrary to the ideas of free
alienability and the sanctity of contract. How can we justify restrictions on prop-
erty rights for owners of art but not for other property holders. 2 The recog-
nition of an artist's right in his creation can, however, be seen as a declaration of
200. Executive Summary, supra note 22, at xix.
201. Id. at xx.
202. Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights 4-6 DUKE L.J. 1532. 1536 (1989).
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public interest in preserving the integrity of artistic creations.2"3 Artist's rights
laws can be analogized with preservation laws, where social interests in promot-
ing historic tradition, culture and art warrants restraining an individual's freedom
to use and dispose of his property.2
Moral rights legislation that provides federal protection to artists regardless of
their bargaining power, their contractual status or even their desire may be bene-
ficial to the American Folk artist, and may in fact protect the integrity of their
art work by allowing them the freedom to remain isolated, innocent and naive,
without forcing them to learn how to protect themselves from the pressures of
savvy outsiders. By awarding a resale royalty to the artist, the government would
be recognizing in a tangible form the value of the individuality of the artist.
However, moral rights legislation that requires an artist to negotiate for his
rights, to register his art,2° or to meet government imposed standards of quality
would have little positive effect for the folk artist, or for the art community in
general. Any waiver provision" would largely undermine the purpose of feder-
al moral rights legislation by eliminating moral rights in situations of unequal
bargaining power 7 and would reduce the moral or resale rights to just another
bargaining chip, effectively degrading them to mere economic rights.
The protection of the artists moral rights through the enactment of a statu-
torily created federal resale royalty right may indeed advance public welfare
through the encouragement of individual effort by personal gain, in keeping with
the stated purpose of the Constitution's copyright provision. Our cultural heritage
would be enhanced by increasing the respect for the individual artist by recogniz-
ing and awarding his natural rights in the work that he creates.2" Consistent
with the Berne Convention, our position as a major art market, and as a member
of the international community, we should give moral rights, including the resale
royalty right as presented in the Berne convention, inalienable and unwaivable,
the full support of our laws.
AFTERWORD
On October 6, 1993, a joint statement by both sides in the Bill Traylor dispute
was released. Traylor's family, stating that they now understood that Charles
Shannon, rather than exploiting Bill Traylor, actually contributed greatly to his
203. Schneider supra note 29, at 105, citing H.R. 5498, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 136 Cong. Rec.
H8271 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Markey, "[lIt is paramount to the very integrity
of our culture that we preserve the integrity of our art works as expressions of the creativity of the
artist.").
204. Gantz supra note 91, at 875.
205. 17 U.S.C. §41 1(a) (West Supp 1992)("Artists are required to register the copyright to works
as a prerequisite to bringing a lawsuit for violation of any of the economic rights in §106 of the
Copyright Act.").
206. 17 U.S.C. §106A(e).
207. Damich, supra note 63, at 966.
208. See L. Duboff, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAw 798, 805 (1977). stating that moral right is
"inalienable and perpetual" to protect the personality and integrity of the culture, "not the economic
interest of the artist."
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support as an artist, have agreed to drop the lawsuit.2" Shannon, on his part,
has agreed to give the family 12 pieces of artwork in trust,210 estimated to be
worth $10,000 to $25,000 each.2"
209. Richard Perez-Penez, Settlement Over Arvork By an Ex-Slave, THE N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7,
1993, at BII.
210. Catherine Fox, Traylor Folk Art Suit Settled: lesson is open mindedness, The ATLANTA J.&
CON ST. Oct. 31, 1993, at N4.
211. Perez-Penez, supra note 209.
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